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O artigo examina as concepções de desemprego involuntario desenvolvidas por Knut 
Wicksell e por Gustav Cassel no inicio do seculo XX, comparando-as com o conceito 
formulado por J.M. Keynes em 1936. Utilizando material não publicado de arquivos e textos 
originais em sueco, o artigo discute as noções de equilibrio e desequilibrio associadas a 
analise do mercado de trabalho no periodo, alem de apresentar evidencia da utilização do 
conceito de taxa de desemprego "normal" e de como a ideia de desemprego friccional foi 












The paper examines the notions of involuntary unemployment put forward by Knut Wicksell 
and Gustav Cassel in the early 1900s, and points out their similarities and differences to J.M. 
Keynes's (1936) concept. Based on unplublished archive material and untranslated Swedish 
texts, the paper discusses the equilibrium and disequilibrium notions associated to the 
analysis of the labour market in that period. It also presents evidence of the use of the notion 
of "normal" rate of unemployment and of the development of the idea of fricctional 
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The concept of “involuntary unemployment”, as well as the controversies surrounding it, 
have become part and parcel of macroeconomic theory since the publication of John Maynard 
Keynes’s  General Theory in 1936. Yet the connection between unemployment and 
involuntary action had been around for a long time before Keynes made it one of the central 
ideas of his book. The description of unemployment as “involuntary” or “enforced” idleness 
can be found in Henry George (1879, p. 6), Alfred Marshall ([1890] 1990, p. 572), John 
Hobson (1895, p. 419), Arthur Pigou (1913, p. 14) and Wesley Mitchell (1913, p. 270), 
among others (see Hutchison, 1953, ch. 24; Kahn, 1976;  Garraty, 1978, ch. 6;  Corry, 1996). 
The distinction between voluntary and involuntary unemployment (“chômeur volontaire” and 
“involontaire”) was conspicuous in the French economic literature at the end of the 19th 
century (e.g., Charles Gide, 1884; Vilfredo Pareto, 1897), especially in the context of the 
discussion on unemployment insurance (see Topalov, 1994, ch. 10). 
  This paper examines the use of the notion of involuntary or forced unemployment 
(“ofrivillig” or “tvungen arbetslöshet”) by the well-known Swedish economists Gustav 
Cassel (1864-1944) and Knut Wicksell (1851-1926), respectively. In public lectures given 
between 1901 and 1907, they put forward classifications of unemployment that also included 
the concepts of voluntary (“frivillig”) and “normal” unemployment. Cassel’s lectures, all 
delivered to the Liberal Club, the Stock Exchange Society and the Workers’ Institute in 
Gothenburg in 1902, were published under the title Socialpolitik (Cassel 1902a); the book 
was reprinted in 1908 and 1922. Wicksell’s unemployment lectures, which were addressed to 
workers’ associations of Malmö in 1901 and of Copenhagen in 1907, were never published, 
but Wicksell’s notes for the Copenhagen lecture have survived, and a report of his Malmö 
lecture was published in the workers’ newspaper Arbetet (22 March 1901).  
  Although those lectures are the only sources of use of the phrase “involuntary (or 
forced) unemployment” by Wicksell and Cassel, we shall argue that the concept was 
important for the development of their respective macroeconomic theories. Furthermore, 
Wicksell’s and Cassel’s classifications and explanations of unemployment are of general 
interest in several respects. First, they cover a wide range of coordination problems in the 
labour market and the macroeconomy, pertaining to both the short and the long run. Second, 
Wicksell and Cassel approach the phenomenon of involuntary unemployment from different 
angles that, moreover, deviate in many ways from the perspectives taken in the contemporary 
literature. Third, their concepts of involuntary unemployment shed light on their 
interpretations of business cycle as a challenge to general equilibrium theory. Wicksell and 
Cassel were among the first to address an immanent problem of neoclassical theory, with its 
emphasis on the principles of scarcity and marginal utility. The problem is exposed by the 
phenomenon of cyclical depressions which, to Wicksell and Cassel, demonstrated that 
continuous full employment of the production factors might require negative rates of interest 
and zero wage rates (both in real terms).  
  Cassel ([1918] 1932a) insisted that one of the main analytical issues of business cycle 
theory is to explain what prevents money wages from falling to zero under the pressure of a 
continuous excess supply of labour, that is, why labour does not become a “free good”. His 
explanation was a rational and organized resistance to wage cuts – an answer that reveals an 
ambiguity in the distinction between involuntary and voluntary unemployment which Cassel 
had pointed out already in his 1902 lectures. Yet, nominal and real wage rigidities played no 
role in Cassel’s and Wicksell’s explanations of cyclical unemployment. While Cassel 
resorted to the wage-rigidity argument in his explanation of the persistent unemployment of 
the 1920s, the notion of “free goods” came to the fore again in connection with permanent 
unemployment, as a by-product of critical examinations of Cassel’s general equilibrium                                                                                                                                                     
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system by Hans Neisser ([1932] 1990) and other critics in the early 1930s. In his well-known 
review of Cassel (1918), Wicksell ([1919] 1934) had anticipated the criticism that wages may 
be zero in long-run equilibrium. In the mid-1920s, when the post-World War I economic 
crisis was over but unemployment rates continued at a high level, Wicksell suggested that 
overpopulation, together with labour-saving technical progress could explain permanent 
unemployment. In an unpublished manuscript probably written between 1923 and 1926, he 
went as far as implicitly recanting his previous interpretation that technological progress can 
cause only temporary unemployment.  
  Our discussion of Wicksell’s and Cassel’s ideas is thus intended to show the richness 
of pre-Keynesian discussions about involuntary unemployment. Section 2 presents the 
classifications of unemployment in Wicksell’s and Cassel’s lectures as well as in the 
contemporary literature. Section 3 sketches the relevant concepts of voluntary unemployment 
and the labour supply curve. Section 4 describes how various notions of normal 
unemployment were set in contrast with earlier concepts of an industrial reserve army. 
Section 5 examines Cassel’s and Wicksell’s approaches to cyclical unemployment. Section 6 
discusses Wicksell’s and Cassel’s views on the causes of permanent unemployment. Section 
7 concludes.     
 
2        Classifications of Unemployment 
2.1 Wicksell 
According to the report in Arbetet, Wicksell started his 1901 lecture on “Unemployment, its 
causes and cures” by stating that, “despite being a topic of great relevance,.. it is nevertheless 
an extremely unexplored subject whose deepest cause is hard to make out”.
1 Wicksell pointed 
out that “the science of political economy has only marginally dealt with this subject, if it has 
not ignored it altogether”. The difficulty arises from the fact that while “it is well understood 
that an exhausted, lazy or frail person cannot work...it is not easy to understand why a 
healthy, strong and fit person should be forced to be unemployed”. Before advancing a 
tentative answer, Wicksell continued his 1901 lecture by distinguishing between modern 
forms of unemployment, which result from the advanced division of labour – “Robinson 
Crusoe could suffer from various problems, but he certainly did not suffer from 
unemployment” – and old times, when “only one kind of unemployment was known, namely 
that of the tramp or vagabond”. Wicksell suggested that the heavy penalties against 
unemployed people resulted from the opinion that, since “society had organized work for 
everybody,.. unemployment could not have any other cause than the worker himself”. This 
opinion, still widespread in his own time, “confuses criminality with unemployment”.
2 As far 
                                                 
1  See Jonung (1989, pp. 30-32) for another account of Wicksell’s Malmö lecture, based on 
Wicksell’s manuscript notes prepared for that lecture. These notes have since been lost and 
the detailed report in Arbetet is the only remaining primary source. It has been reproduced 
in Swedberg (1998, pp. 114-23). The main difference between Jonung’s account and the 
report is that Jonung (1989, p.31) refers only to the three categories of forced 
unemployment discussed by Wicksell, but not to the distinction between voluntary and 
forced unemployment. It should also be noted that at the time of the 1901 Malmö lecture, 
Wicksell and Cassel were rivals for a professorship at Lund University, eventually won by 
Wicksell in November of that year (see Gårdlund, 1958, ch. VII, for a fascinating account 
of that famous competition). 
 
2  For interpretations of unemployment in pre-industrial times akin to Wicksell’s, see Garraty                                                                                                                                                     
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as moderns forms of unemployment are concerned, he distinguished between three 
categories: “voluntary”, “by conflict”, and “forced”, which he subdivided into “normal” and 
“periodical”. Finally, periodical unemployment was further subdivided into “seasonal” and 
unemployment caused by “crises and bad times”.  In the 1901 lecture, Wicksell defined 
voluntary unemployment as chosen leisure. Wicksell’s “voluntary unemployment” belongs, 
therefore, in the realm of the determinants of the labour supply curve, as discussed in section 
3 below. Wicksell (1901) was very brief on his second category, “unemployment by 
conflict”. He remarked that “it is not too difficult to eliminate”, if there is “tolerance on both 
sides”. “Conflict” probably refers to industrial disputes between trade unions and firms over 
wages, as suggested by a passage in volume 1 of Wicksell’s Lectures on Political Economy 
(p. 51) on “wage disputes” and the arbitration of “conflicts” between employers and 
employed.
3 
  The core of the Malmö Lecture is the notion of forced unemployment, as Wicksell 
pointed out: “If the focus is set on the dangers to society, the various types of forced  
unemployment have to be taken into account” (italics in the original). The first category [of 
forced unemployment] that we shall take a look at is the so-called normal unemployment. Its 
causes vary a lot. Take the example of a worker who is made to quit, or quits, his job. While 
he looks for new work, he belongs to the category of the unemployed. Even if such search 
activities do not take much time, a certain number of workers will always be unemployed just 
because they are engaged in searching.” The other category of forced unemployment 
discussed in the Malmö lecture was “periodical unemployment”, which is “hard to fight, even 
if people know when it is going to strike”. The first type considered is caused by the “so-
called seasonal work”, which can be predicted to a certain extent. The second kind of 
periodical unemployment discussed by Wicksell is associated with business cycles and crises. 
After dismissing the Marxian argument that overproduction is caused by underconsumption 
and low wages,
4 Wicksell states in the Malmö lecture that “the cause of bad times is to be 
found elsewhere, in the choice of wrong directions in production. Overproduction of a 
commodity means that output is excessive relative to the production of other commodities, 
and thereby their exchange is put out of equilibrium.” 
The notion that the depression is caused by partial overproduction and frictions in the 
transference of capital and labour between sectors can also be found in Wicksell’s notes 
written at the time for the lectures on “commercial crises” at the University of Lund (see 
                                                                                                                                                   
(1978, ch. 1 and 2) and Schumpeter (1954, p. 270). Wicksell’s source on historical material 
was probably Adler (1895), whose entry on unemployment in the German Handwörterbuch 
der Staatswissen-schaften, the main dictionary of economics at the time, is referred to by 
Wicksell in his remark that “there is an economic dictionary of six fat volumes which was 
edited in Germany some time ago, but you would not find any entry on ’unemployment’ in 
the whole edition. It was only in a supplementary volume that this deficiency was 
remedied”. 
3  Wicksell ([1901] 1906, p. 51) pointed out that the equilibrium wage rate is an 
“indeterminate problem” under bilateral monopoly. However, in his 1924 review of a book 
by A. Bowley, he showed that, under the assumption that the seller (i.e. the trade union) 
sets the price, the bilateral monopoly problem has a determinate solution (Wicksell [1924] 
1958, pp. 223-25; see Ståhl, 1978). 
4 On Wicksell’s critique of underconsumption theories see also Boianovsky and Trautwein 
(2001).                                                                                                                                                     
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Boianovsky and Trautwein, 2001).  
  Wicksell’s general explanation of the “unemployment puzzle” posed in the 
introduction to his Malmö lecture can be found in the remark in his 1907 manuscript that “the 
most common cause of unemployment (to which all others are related) is that human work, 
even if indispensable in all production, cannot by itself produce anything - it is just 
supervising and directing natural forces and capital”. For Wicksell (1907), the 
complementarity of labour, capital and land is the key to the unemployment puzzle – in 
contrast with his own microeconomic theory of production and distribution ([1901] 1934, 




  Cassel’s 1902 classification of unemployment is part of his lecture on the “tasks for 
public social policy” (Cassel 1902a, ch. IV). Apart from three other lectures on social policy, 
the book also includes chapters on “trade union policy” and the “high-wage economy”.
5  
Apparently, it resulted from Cassel’s visit to Britain in 1901-02, where he entered into 
contact with Sidney and Beatrice Webb, who had published their classic Industrial 
Democracy in 1897. The Webbs’ influence is visible not only in the 1902 volume, but also in 
the chapter on wages in Cassel’s main work, Theory of Social Economy, written between 
1911 and 1914, but published in 1918 (see Montgomery, 1947, pp. 532-33). Like in Wicksell 
(1901), one of the main tasks of public social policy discussed in Cassel (1902a, pp. 100-104) 
is unemployment insurance. However, while Wicksell dealt with issues pertaining to the 
funding of unemployment insurance, Cassel drew attention to the distinction between 
insurance against “voluntary” and “involuntary” unemployment. 
The issue of insurance against unemployment is perhaps the one that is most relevant 
for the worker. It is significantly complicated by the fact that workers need to insure 
themselves against two different kinds of  unemployment. In this context we totally 
disregard any kind of voluntary unemployment that is due to laziness or careless ways 
of living. There is another kind of voluntary unemployment that a trade union chooses 
to  stand when it prefers not to work at the conditions offered by the employers. That 
kind of unemployment is extremely difficult to distinguish from the purely involuntary 
one, which is caused by a complete shortfall of demand for labour. (Cassel, 1902a, p. 
102; italics added). 
The notion that trade unions should prevent their members from underbidding wages below 
the “Standard Rate” decided by the “Common Rule”, and that “Out of Work benefit” should 
be used to implement that policy, is one of the main concepts of the Webb’s Industrial 
Democracy (1897, pp. 161-66).
6 As pointed out by Cassel, “competition would always be 
                                                 
5 Lindahl (1958, p. 24) reports that Cassel’s 1902 lectures were considered rather radical by 
the academic establishment, which delayed his appointment to a professorship at the 
University of Stockholm until 1904. In the same vein, Wicksell’s appointment to Lund 
University in 1901 was preceded by intense debates about what appeared to be Wicksell’s 
neo-Malthusian radicalism. 
6 “As understood and administered by all Trade Unions, the Out of the Work benefit is not 
valued exclusively, or even mainly, for its protection of the individual against 
casualities...Its most important function is to protect the Standard Rate of wages and other 
normal conditions of employment from being ‘eaten away’, in bad times, by the                                                                                                                                                     
  
6 
distorted if external forces intervene”. This would be the case if the workers were insured 
against unemployment by the state under the condition that they “take any jobs on offer”. 
Accordingly, Cassel was “of the opinion that trade unions should take over all insurance 
against unemployment, be it caused by conflicts with the employers or by temporary 
shortfalls in the demand for labour” (p. 103; italics added). It is worth noting that Cassel’s 
remark that workers withhold their labour supply in wage conflicts is reminiscent of 
Wicksell’s category of “unemployment by conflict” in the Malmö lecture. Even though 
Wicksell, unlike Cassel, did not call it “voluntary” unemployment, he may have been aware 
of the ambiguity pointed out by Cassel. He suggested that the insurance principle should be 
applied only insofar as the occurrence of unemployment was uncertain, and not against 
fluctuations in labour demand that can be foreseen. 
Cassel’s use of the phrase “normal unemployment” is not the same as Wicksell’s, 
since the emphasis is on the predictability of seasonal or regular changes in labour demand, 
instead of search unemployment as in Wicksell. This can be explained by the fact that Cassel 
was making a distinction in the context of unemployment insurance literature, where the 
notion of “risk” is crucial (see Topalov, 1994). Furthermore, we have seen that Wicksell 
treated seasonal unemployment as akin to the “normal” mismatch in the labour market. The 
idea of mismatch unemployment is nevertheless present in Cassel’s more general discussion 
of wages and unemployment in sections 36 and 37 of his Theory of Social Economy: “The 
frequent change of job, which is inevitable in the present organization of many industries, 
such as the building industry, is bound to appear in the statistics in a certain not 
inconsiderable percentage of unemployment, but this does not mean that employers then have 
no difficulty in meeting their demand for labour... A well-organized labour exchange will 
reduce this type of unemployment to a minimum, but can never completely eliminate it” 
(Cassel, [1918] 1932a, p. 349; italics added).
7 
The concept of search or frictional unemployment as the kind of unemployment that 
coexists with unfilled vacancies and unsatisfied demand for labour elsewhere – which is 
implicit in Beveridge (1909, ch. V), a book mentioned by Cassel ([1918] 1932a, p. 345, n.1), 
but explicit only in Beveridge (1944, pp. 408-09) – comes out in the italicized passage quoted 
from Cassel above. 
  Cassel did not use the “voluntary/involuntary” distinction either in his 1918 magnum 
opus, although the concepts can be found. This can be in part explained by the crucial 
ambiguity of that distinction, pointed out for the first time in his Socialpolitik. Cassel ([1918] 
1932a) was influenced, instead, by the analysis of the composition of the unemployed labour 
force advanced by the Webbs (1909, part II, ch. IV) in the famous “Minority Report” of the 
Poor Law Commission, which concluded that the “large army of those in need of relief” is 
constantly “being fed with new recruits...solely as a result of the organization of the labour 
market” (Cassel [1918] 1932a, pp. 345-46).
8 According to Cassel, these groups of workers of 
                                                                                                                                                   
competition of members driven by necessity to accept the employers’ terms.” (Webb and 
Webb, 1897, p. 165) 
7 Unless otherwise stated, all passages quoted from the 1932 edition of Cassel’s Theory of 
Social Economy also appear in the first 1918 edition. 
8 The Webbs (1909, p. 164) distinguished between four categories of unemployed: (i) “those 
who have lately been in definite situation of presumed permanency” (“The Men from 
Permanent Situations”)  ; (ii) “those who normally...shift from job to job, with more or less 
interval between jobs” (“The Men of Discontinuous Employments”); (iii) “those who 
normally earn a bare subsistence by casual jobs, lasting only a few hours each, or a day or                                                                                                                                                     
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low efficiency, reflecting the heterogeneous composition of labour supply, form what is 
usually described as the “industrial reserve army” – a concept whose critical treatment by 
Wicksell and others will be further discussed in section 4 below. 
According to Cassel, unemployment in such periods of depressions raise a crucial 
analytical problem concerning the existence of a “scarcity of labour” that is necessary to 
warrant the payment of “any wages at all”. Cassel’s explanation, based on the workers’ 
withholding of their supply of labour, confirms the ambiguity of the voluntary/involuntary 
distinction advanced in 1902. 
 
2.3  The Contemporary Literature 
The distinction between “involuntary” and “voluntary unemployment” (in Wicksell’s and 
Cassel’s meanings) was not usually part of the English literature before Keynes (1936), 
simply because unemployment was defined by British and American economists as 
“involuntary” or “enforced” idleness. Hence, to write about “voluntary unemployment” was a 
contradiction in terms. This is probably best illustrated by the chapter on “the meaning and 
measurement of unemployment” in Pigou’s 1913 monograph Unemployment, where the 
author warns that “unemployment is one of those many terms in common use...but which it 
is, nevertheless, somewhat difficult to define with accuracy”. The main source of difficulty 
resides in the fact that  
[u]nemployment clearly does not include all the idleness of wage-earners, but only 
that part of it which is, from their point of view and in their existing condition at the 
time, involuntary... There is...excluded the idleness of those who are idle, not from 
necessity, but from choice... Yet again, there is excluded the idleness of the great mass 
of the vagrant class, whose ambition is, in large part, just to avoid work. And, finally, 
there is excluded the ‘playing’ of those workpeople who are idle on account of a strike 
or a lock-out (Pigou, 1913, pp. 14-15; italics in the original).  
That is, unemployment is implicitly defined as workers being off the labour supply curve.
9  
                                                                                                                                                   
two” (“The Under-Employed”); (iv) “those who have been ousted, or have wilfully 
withdrawn themselves from the ranks of the workers” (“The Unemployable”). 
 
9 The first explicit definition (and diagrammatic illustration) of involuntary unemployment as 
a point off the labour supply curve was apparently provided by Joan Robinson (1937, pp. 
176-78). Keynes’s famous definition (1936, p. 15) in terms of the increase of labour supply 
and labour demand induced by a fall in real wages when prices go up, can be made 
consistent with Robinson’s concept. Nevertheless, Keynes aimed at the distinction between 
involuntary unemployment that could not be eliminated by workers accepting lower money-
wages, and voluntary unemployment, which could be so reduced (see Corry, 1996). 
Interestingly enough, the phrases “voluntary” and “frictional” unemployment were 
suggested to Keynes by Roy Harrod in correspondence of July 1935, who pointed out that 
“frictional unemployment is also in a sense involuntary” (Moggridge, 1973, p. 527); see also 
Keynes’s reference to “involuntary unemployment, apart from frictional unemployment...” 
(1936, p.10) and to the decision to exclude frictional unemployment from the definition of 
involuntary unemployment “for reasons of convenience” (1936, p.15). In Wicksell’s Malmö 
lecture, as discussed above, “forced unemployment” is inclusive of search unemployment. 
As pointed out by Robinson (1937, p. 172), Keynes’s definition of involuntary 
unemployment is correct only if the wage elasticity of labour supply is not negative.                                                                                                                                                     
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From the Pigovian perspective, even unemployment caused by wage rigidity could be 
understood as involuntary, since the contraction in labour demand brought about by higher 
real wages is unintended.
10 This differs from Cassel’s 1902 voluntary unemployment, defined 
by the workers’ choice to withhold their labour supply at wage rates deemed to be 
temporarily below equilibrium level.  
  Apparently, the first British economist to define unemployment as “all forms of 
involuntary leisure suffered by the working class” was Hobson (1895, p. 419; see Hutchison, 
1953, p. 413; Corry, 1996, p. 13), in a critical reaction to the path-breaking discussion of the 
concept of unemployment in the 1893 “Report on the Agencies and Methods for Dealing 
with the Unemployed” produced by H. Llewellyn Smith for the Labour Department at the 
Board of Trade (see Harris, 1996, pp. 63-64). Following the trend set by Charles Booth’s 
([1889] 1902) pioneer empirical investigation of poverty in London, Llewellyn Smith (1893, 
p. 8) repeated Booth’s idea that “the total number of the superfluous is the true measure of 
the unemployed”.
11 The unemployed are a “surplus, in the sense that the labour market would 
be in a better condition for their total removal” (p. 7).  
This raised two kinds of critical reactions by British economists, most notably Hobson 
(1895) and Beveridge (1907, 1909). Hobson accepted the starting-point that “unemployment” 
means excess or superfluous labour supply and agreed that if “leakages belongs to an 
irregularity inherent in the trade, it cannot rank as waste”, but pointed out that, to the extent 
that the length of the interval between jobs is affected by the level of activity itself, there is a 
“genuine waste of labour-power” (p. 416).
12 Likewise, the army of workers unemployed 
because of cyclical depression should be deemed as excess labour supply – in  contrast with 
Booth’s notion of a “reserve of labour” formed by a necessary “unemployed margin” of 
skilled workers “waiting” to be absorbed later on.  
  Beveridge (1909), too, defined unemployment as “involuntary” or “enforced idleness” 
(see Topalov, 1994, p. 184). But he brought into the picture the notion that the “reserve of 
labour” (title of ch. V) should be explained by the “degree of friction” in the movement of 
labour (p. 103), a concept largely absent from Llewellyn Smith (1893), Hobson (1895) and 
even Pigou (1913), but present in Wicksell’s 1901 idea of “normal unemployment”. While 
the phrase “voluntary unemployment” was conspicuous by its absence in the pre-Keynesian 
English literature, the French equivalent “chômage volontaire” (and “involontaire”) could be 
easily found (see Topalov, 1994, ch. 10). One possible explanation is that the word 
“chômage”, which has existed since the Middle Ages, derives from the Greek “kauma” 
(“burning heat”) via the medieval Latin “caumare” (meaning “to take one’s ease during the 
heat of the day”) and is rooted on the idea of “being at leisure” (see Garraty, 1978, p. 4; 
                                                 
10 See Ralph Hawtrey’s criticism of Keynes’s definition of voluntary unemployment in 
correspondence of April 1936, reproduced in Moggridge (1973, p. 29). 
11 Booth ([1889] 1902) divided the London population into eight classes. The lowest (class A) 
was formed by a “savage, semi-criminal” of casual labourers  “beyond redemption”, while 
the “very poor” (class B) consisted of workers frequently unemployed for personal reasons. 
The solution to both problems of poverty and unemployment was, according to Booth, to 
exclude class B from the labour market through the creation of labour colonies. This would 
improve the conditions of classes C and D, and end the confusion between class A and the 
unemployed (see Garraty, 1978, pp.11-13). 
12 The notion that the extent of frictional unemployment  fluctuates over the business cycle 
was later discussed by Robinson (1937, chapter 2) and Phelps (1967); see also Boianovsky 
(2000).                                                                                                                                                     
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Topalov, 1994, p. 190).
13 “Chômage involontaire” is therefore close to “involuntary 
idleness”, which was the English definition of “unemployment” at the time. This is clearly 
the case in Pareto’s use of the phrase as part of a discussion of the composition of the labour 
force in volume 2 of his classic Cours. According to Pareto (1897, p. 378), the description of 
the labour force should include data on workers who “chôment involontairement”, but “it is 
impossible to know that number, even approximately”. All we know is the aggregate number 
of individuals” out of work”, formed by different categories, including the “ouvriers actifs, 
intelligent et laborieux” who, for reasons of an accidental and unforeseen nature - usually 
associated with economic crises - are temporarily out of work. These are apparently the 
involuntarily unemployed, who wish but cannot work at the prevailing wage rate (see also 
Boianovsky and Tarascio, 1998).  
 
3  Voluntary Unemployment and the Labour Supply 
In both the Malmö and Copenhagen lectures Wicksell defined “voluntary unemployment” as 
time for recreation. This should be seen against the institutional organization of labour 
markets at the time, when paid holidays were rare and workers had to face the marginal 
decision between paid working weeks and unpaid time off. This is clear from Marshall’s 
discussion of the influence of “inconstancy of employment” on wages, where it is pointed out 
that the conclusion that average wages should be higher in seasonal and cyclical occupations 
is valid only if “we assume that the rest and leisure, which a man gets when out of 
employment, are of no service to him directly or indirectly” ([1890] 1990, p. 462). Marshall 
accepted that assumption whenever “waiting for work... involves so much anxiety and worry 
that it causes more strain that the work itself would do”.
14 In this case the marginal disutility 
of searching for jobs is higher than the marginal disutility of work, which fits with Marshall’s 
idea of “enforced idleness” briefly mentioned elsewhere in the book (p. 572; added in the 
second edition, 1891). “But that is not always so”, for “interruptions of work that occur in the 
regular course of business, and therefore raise no fears about the future, give opportunity for 
the system to recruit itself and lay in stores of energy for future exertions” (p. 462).  
  The assumption that voluntary off-time can be regarded as a source of utility for the 
worker is made throughout Wicksell’s treatment of the labour supply curve in terms of 
leisure and income.
15 Unlike Walras, Wicksell assumed in his general equilibrium models of 
production and capital as a first approximation that the utility of the use of the factors of 
                                                 
13 The earliest recorded use of the English word “unemployment” is in a 1887 report prepared 
by Carrol Wright, chief of the Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics, who defined the new 
concept as “those who really want employment” but cannot get it (see Garraty, 1978, p. 
109; Topalov, p. 178). The Swedish word “arbetslöshet” was first used by the Poor Relief 
Commission of 1870, but its meaning was still mixed up with vagrancy (see Magnusson, 
1989, pp. 200-201). 
14 In this connection, Marshall referred to Foxwell’s famous 1886 lecture on unemployment, 
which might have been a source of influence on Wicksell, too. 
15 Wicksell  (1893 and 1901), together with Wicksteed ([1910] 1967, pp. 522-26), was one 
the first to define the labour supply decision in terms of choice between income and the 
marginal utility of leisure, instead of between income and the marginal disutility of labour 
as in Jevons and Keynes. The results coincide only if the marginal utility of income is 
constant, which implies that the marginal disutility of labour is the same as the marginal 
rate of substitution of income for leisure. The Wicksell-Wicksteed formulation is the one 
adopted nowadays.                                                                                                                                                     
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production directly by their owners is insignificant compared to the indirect utility derived 
from their productive employment in the market, which means that the amount of factors of 
production available on the market is taken as a given quantity (Wicksell [1901] 1934, pp. 98 
and 103) irrespective of their prices. The individual supply curve of labour is backward 
sloping, since (what we now call) the negative income effect of a higher real wage begins at 
some point to outweigh the positive substitution effect (see Wicksell, [1893] 1954, p. 91, and 
[1901] 1934, pp. 45-46). This does not necessarily reduce the effective volume of labour 
supplied since the higher wage tends to have a joint positive effect on the efficiency and the 
number of workers in the market. Wicksell’s definition of voluntary unemployment in his 
unemployment lectures may be read as a comment on workers’ reaction to wage increases 
that enable them to take time off. Wicksell did not refer on that occasion to a reduction of 
working hours, probably because, as his audience was aware, the working day is mostly 




         
4  Normal unemployment and the Industrial Reserve Army 
In the late 19th Century, a large part of the literature on unemployment was strongly 
influenced by the Marxian concept of an industrial reserve army, a large number of people 
who, as a consequence of labour-saving technical progress, become unemployed even in 
normal times and whose competition for jobs helps to depress wages (see section 2.3, and 
Adler, 1895). In contrast with the notion of the industrial reserve, the existence of frictional 
unemployment in normal conditions – that is, a “normal rate of unemployment”, as put 
forward in the Malmö lecture – does not imply any downward pressure on wages, which is 
also true of Cassel’s interpretation of the equilibrium of the labour market (see section 2.2).
17  
  Cassel ([1918] 1932a, pp. 346-47, 357) examined carefully how unemployment and 
scarcity of labour with positive wages may coexist. Despite his pointing out that a small 
measured rate of unemployment does not necessarily reflect an excess supply of labour, since 
there might be at the same time unfilled vacancies (p. 349), Cassel’s argument was not based 
on frictions in the working of the market, but on the heterogeneity of labour. He claimed that 
there is usually “permanent” unemployment of low efficiency workers, together with a 
                                                 
16 Unlike Wicksell, Cassel did not accept the concept of marginal utility as foundation of the 
theory of demand. This is also true of the “disutility theory” of labour supply, a 
“meaningless theoretical construction” according to Cassel ([1918] 1932, p. 360), whose 
explanation of the supply of effort was based on the view that both workers and employers 
realize that “the greatest individual economic result is obtained not by the greatest possible 
effort at any moment, but rather by a wise distribution of work over the day, week, or life”. 
There has occurred historically a reduction of the working-day simultaneously with an 
“intensification of work” decided by “custom or agreement” between trade unions and 
employers (p. 356). 
17 See Samuelson’s (1967) interpretation of the industrial reserve army as a condition of 
temporary excess supply of labour, which depresses real wages until the unemployed are 
absorbed at a wage rate corresponding to the marginal productivity of labour. As pointed 
out by Samuelson, it is not the mere existence of the unemployed, but their competition for 
jobs, that pushes the wage rate down, and, even so, not to its subsistence level. In 
Samuelson’s interpretation, in contrast with Wicksell’s and Cassel’s, there is no room for 
search or frictional unemployment.                                                                                                                                                     
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“scarcity of labour of a particular high quality” (p. 346), clearly a mismatch of qualifications 
offered and demanded “The process we have described bears a certain resemblance to that of 
the extension of the area under cultivation when the demand for foodstuffs increases - in 
which case land of increasingly poorer quality has to be taken into cultivation.” (Cassel 
[1918] 1932a, p. 347). Cassel, however, was aware that the analogy is far from perfect, since, 
in contrast with land, labour has a positive reservation price. Cassel’s solution to the puzzle, 
discussed in the following sections, will take us back to the intrinsic ambiguity of the 
distinction between voluntary and involuntary unemployment pointed out in 1902.   
 
5  Unemployment, Wages and the Business Cycle 
5.1 Cassel 
In periods of depression, “workers of normal efficiency, too, often fall out of employment” 
(Cassel [1918] 1932a, p. 348). What happens to money wages under those circumstances? “If 
a certain amount of unemployment is caused as a result of a decline in demand, one would 
think, on general grounds of price theory, that the excessive supply of labour must bring 
wages down, and that this pressure on wages would not cease until unemployment was 
somehow diminished by the stimulus given to demand or, if this result could not be brought 
about, until wages had fallen to zero. In practice, however, matters are not so. The 
unemployed resist with all their power any reduction of wages, and are extremely reluctant to 
offer their labour at a lower price” (Cassel [1918] 1932a, p. 357). The withholding of labour 
supply is made possible by the payment of unemployment benefits by trade unions, which 
prevents underbidding in the labour market. This is Cassel’s solution to what he regarded as 
one of the main problems of the theory of wages: 
It is only by an artificial scarcity of labour brought about in this way that we are at all 
able to explain theoretically a state of equilibrium existing simultaneously with the 
payment of wages at a certain level at a time when there is unemployment (ibidem). 
Because of the withholding of labour supply at the current wage rates, the labour market is in 
equilibrium in the sense that there is no tendency for wages to change. But, at the same time, 
there is unemployment measured by the distance between the actual employment level, 
determined by the intersection of the labour demand curve with the infinitely elastic segment 
of the labour supply curve (at prevailing money-wages), and the maximum amount of 
employment that workers are willing to offer at that wage rate. Unemployment is involuntary 
in the sense that the unemployed would rather work at the going wage rates, and yet it is 
voluntary in the sense that workers prefer to be unemployed instead of bidding down wages – 
which might explain why Cassel did not use the voluntary/involuntary distinction in his 
textbook. 
  The withholding of labour supply also explains why labour does not become a “free 
good” with zero price in the depression, despite continuous unemployment. This was also a 
matter of concern for Keynes (1936, p. 304), who pointed out that, if workers did not resist a 
reduction in their money wages, “there would be no resting-place below full employment 
until either the rate of interest was incapable of falling further or wages were zero” (see also 
pp. 191 and 253). Keynes’s explanation of nominal wage rigidity was based on the 
assumption that workers tend to interpret a fall in money wages as a microeconomic change 
that affects relative wages (1936, pp. 14, 303). In Cassel, the source of wage rigidity is the 
workers’ perception of a temporary fall of demand during the business cycle, a notion briefly                                                                                                                                                     
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mentioned by Keynes (p. 16) in his criticism of the “classical economists”.
18  
  Cassel (1904; [1918] 1932a, book IV) interpreted business cycles as deviations of the 
economy from its steady-state full-employment growth path (see Boianovsky, 1999). One of 
the central contributions of his 1918 book is the extension of the concept of equilibrium to 
the “uniformly progressive society”, where output and the stock of capital grow at the same 
steady rate, determined by the exogenous rate of population growth. In equilibrium, the rate 
of interest is such that the supply of savings, the demand for investment and the value of new 
capital goods produced are of the same magnitude. In uniform growth, the equilibrium 
capital-output ratio (v) will be equal to the proportion of income saved (s) divided by the rate 
of population growth (n), that is: v = s/n, which is reminiscent of the so-called Harrod-Domar 
formula with the essential difference that v is the endogenous variable in Cassel’s 
formulation. According to Cassel ([1918] 1932a, p. 62), “only during transition periods will 
there be a a material difference between the rate of increase of capital and of income”. The 
upshot is that Cassel’s “unemployment equilibrium” is a transitory condition that ends when 
demand for new capital goods rises again:    
The depression also creates corresponding forces which tend to counteract it: there are 
then low prices for materials of fixed capital and low wages. These factors cheapen 
the production of fixed capital, at the same time as the low rate of interest, itself a 
result of the depression, raises the value of the completed capital goods. The co-
operation of these factors overcomes the depression and leads to an upward 




  The issue of the interval of time necessary for unemployment to affect wages was 
hotly debated between Malthus and Ricardo, as pointed out by Sowell (1972, pp. 125-27).
20 
Assuming that wages are flexible with a lag, being determined by the “competition of the 
unemployed”, a deflationary process will produce not only continuous falling prices – which, 
by its effect on banking reserves in a non-pure credit system, will eventually bring the market 
rate of interest back to its equilibrium level and put an end to the cumulative process – but 
also a fall in employment and output. The real wage can be assumed to be constant, since the 
money wages are falling at the same rate as the price level, so that there is continuous 
deflation with constant  unemployment (see Kohn, 1981, p. 873).
21  
                                                 
18 Interestingly enough, the Webbs’ interpretation of nominal wage rigidity was quite the 
opposite of Keynes’s. They suggested in Industrial Democracy (pp. 793-94) that, if a trade 
union perceived that the reduction in labour demand was not limited to that industry but a 
general one, it should resist the wage fall, since “any such reduction could not possibly 
increase the aggregate demand (which is the aggregate product).” 
19 See Keynes’s (1936, ch. 19) discussion of the indirect positive effects of money-wage 
reduction on employment through its impact on the rate of interest and the marginal 
efficiency of capital. 
20 Malthus stated in correspondence with Ricardo that “we know from repeated experience 
that the money price of labour never falls till many workmen have been for some time out 
of work”, to which Ricardo replied by saying that “insufficient demand for labour must 
mean a diminishing reward for the labourer, and not a diminishing employment of them” 
(Sowell, 1972, pp. 126-27). 
21 This is in marked contrast with the famous “banana parable” used (and later abandoned) by 
Keynes in his neo-Wicksellian Treatise on Money, where excess saving brings about a                                                                                                                                                     
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  Wicksell never addressed what we may call “Cassel’s problem” – to explain what 
prevents money wages from falling to zero in the depression. This may be due to the fact that 
he did not, in contrast with Cassel, investigate the properties of “unemployment equilibrium”, 
but set his focus instead on disequilibrium states of the labour market as described in his 
cumulative process. This is also true of Wicksell’s treatment of the business cycle, which he 
kept separate from the analysis of the “cumulative process”. According to Wicksell ([1907] 
1953), cyclical fluctuations in economic activity (as opposed to cumulative changes in 
nominal variables or once-and-for-all changes in real variables) originate in shocks 
represented by the irregular pace of technical progress, which cause regular fluctuations 
because of the lag structure of the economy – what later became to be known as the 
“impulse-propagation mechanism” (see Boianovsky, 1995). In this framework, the main 
feature of a cyclical depression is that, due to the interest inelasticity of the demand for fixed 
capital goods, no positive market rate of interest may equilibrate saving and investment at full 
employment.  
Hence the task is one of providing cheap credit for all who are willing to produce for 
stock in times of depression. Among other things this will contribute to the reduction 
of unemployment to a far greater extent than the few and inadequate emergency 
projects, which are initiated at such times by local and other government authorities 
([1907] 1953, p. 68).
22 
Wicksell did not explicitly associate his concept of “natural” or “normal” rate of interest with 
the idea of a “normal rate of unemployment” introduced in the Malmö lecture, in the sense of 
the proposition that the rate of unemployment is at its “normal” level when the market rate of 
interest is at its equilibrium level.  Nevertheless, as suggested in Interest and Prices ([1898], 
1936, p. 62), the “sudden cessation” of the price rise is caused by an attempt of individuals to 
increase their real cash balances when “confidence has been strained and general mistrust 
prevails”. This leads to a falsification of the over-optimistic expectations engendered by the 
                                                                                                                                                   
cumulative contraction in output “until all production ceases and the entire population 
starves to death” (Keynes, [1930] 1971, p. 160). 
22 In a public lecture on “crises and unemployment” delivered to trade unions in Stockholm 
and summed up in Dagens Nyheter of November 17, 1908, Wicksell remarked that “it is 
ridiculous to see how people behave in a period of general unemployment like this. They 
rub their hands and try to find out public works, and it always comes to stone cracking. But 
there are thousands of other things which should be done to turn into inventories, including 
building houses, making clothes and all sorts of durable goods” to be used later in the 
boom. Wicksell opposed to emergency “relief works” of the sort deployed in Sweden and 
other countries at the time, which differed from the concept of countercyclical public 
investment introduced by the Webbs in 1909 (pp. 280-87). Actually, the notion of a 
“deliberate policy aimed at forestalling unemployment” was already present in Cassel 
(1902a, p. 104), who suggested that “we must so arrange that in every public enterprise we 
take account of the market situation and act in conformity...In this way the public organs of 
society could achieve not a little by way of levelling out the market and thus forestalling 
unemployment”. However, Cassel’s enthusiasm for countercyclical public works 
diminished with the years, because he feared that they would diminish the supply of capital 
to the private sector and keep real wages above the level consistent with full employment. 
In the 1930s, when the topic was on the order of the day, he gave just qualified support for 
public works (see Carlson, 1993).                                                                                                                                                     
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continuous and accelerating increase in prices. This is consistent with Wicksell’s discussion 
of economic crises in the Malmö lecture and with the view that the economic system will be 
on its “normal unemployment” equilibrium path whenever profit expectations of 
entrepreneurs are not misled by cumulative price changes.
23  However, as pointed out by 
Wicksell, employment fluctuations over the business cycle (as opposed to economic crises) 
are brought about by shifts in investment based on correct evaluations of the rate of return on 
capital. The 1901 notion of normal unemployment as a search phenomenon can still be 
accommodated, although the explanation of why searching time changes over the business 
cycle cannot fall back on mistaken expectations of employers. 
 
5.3 Abnormal  Depressions 
The connection between falling prices and unemployment was stressed by Wicksell again in 
the early 1920s, when the average rate of unemployment in Sweden and other countries rose 
to 25 per cent under the impact of a short but intense deflation (see Boianovsky, 1998). That 
was not a typical cyclical depression. Wicksell’s interpretation of unemployment, 
documented by many of his articles in the Swedish press at the time, was based on two 
factors: the impact of unexpectedly falling prices on the real burden of debt and resulting 
bankruptcies, and – to the extent that the price fall started to be anticipated – money hoarding 
accompanied by the postponement of consumption expenditure. The “involuntary” or 
”forced” nature of massive unemployment was clear enough, since money wages fell swiftly 
in the process. Cassel put forward a similar explanation of the real effects of deflation, 
although his interpretation of its causes and of the goals of monetary policy differed from 
Wicksell’s (see Boianovsky, 1998). In his Theory of Social Economy he put the blame for 
rising mass unemployment in the Great Depression of the early 1930s on the wrong monetary 
policy of the central bankers. Money-wage rigidity is conspicuous by its absence in Cassel’s 
reading of the causes of the “fantastic figures of the number of employed” in the Great 
Depression ([1918] 1932a, p. 507), although some rigidity was necessary to explain why 
wages remained above zero level. Real wage rigidities were, however, discussed by Cassel, 
Wicksell and others as an explanation for the persistently high average rate of unemployment 
of about 10 per cent in many European countries throughout the 1920s, as discussed next.  
 
6  The Rule of Free Goods and Permanent Unemployment  
6.1 Wicksell 
In 1919 Wicksell wrote a long critical review of Cassel (1918) that was later translated into 
German and English. In the book review, Wicksell ([1919] 1934, p. 255) praised the sections 
on business cycle theory as “incomparably the best part of [Cassel’s] work”, but was quite 
critical of the rest of the book. One of the criticisms that have attracted the attention of 
historians of thought is Wicksell’s comment that Cassel’s general equilibrium system may 
                                                 
23 The influence of price expectations on the workers’ labour supply decision and of wage 
expectations on firms’ demand for labour was stressed many years later by Phelps (1967) 
and Friedman (1968) to explain fluctuations of the actual rate of unemployment around its 
equilibrium value, which Friedman called the “natural rate of unemployment” in analogy 
with Wicksell’s “natural rate of interest”. Friedman’s idea had been anticipated by 
Champernowne’s (1936) concept of a “basic rate of unemployment” (see Boianovsky, 
2000), but neither Friedman nor Champernowne based their hypothesis on the notion of 
involuntary search unemployment, in contrast with Wicksell’s brief suggestions.                                                                                                                                                     
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not have a solution with positive prices for one or more production factors: 
The “simultaneous equations” are no guarantee that any “variable” cannot assume the 
value nil, even if we are discussing so important a social factor as wages or so 
questionable - not to say odious - a social factor as the rent of land, site-rent, or certain 
monopoly revenue, etc. (p. 228) 
The notion that the demand for any factor (especially labour) may fall short of its supply in 
Cassel’s system came to the fore in the early 1930s in articles by Neisser ([1932] 1990), 
Zeuthen (1932) and others. Such factors, as briefly remarked by Wicksell before, could no 
longer be regarded as scarce and should have a price of zero, which became known in the 
literature as the “rule of free goods”. Analytically, the equations of demand and supply of 
each factor should be replaced by inequalities expressed by complementary slackness 
conditions, which would make it possible to identify free and scarce factors endogenously 
and would open the way to formal existence theorems. Cassel was aware, of course, of the 
notion of “free goods”, but – instead of deriving from market processes which factors are free 
– he assumed that only scarce factors are included in the general equilibrium system (see 
Weintraub, 1983, p. 7).
24 The single, but important, exception was his discussion of cyclical 
unemployment and the suggestion that (what we now call) the “rule of free goods” does not 
apply under those circumstances, since workers will withhold their labour supply to prevent 
money-wages from falling to zero (see Morishima, 1976, ch. 7, who claims that Keynes did 
not accept the rule of free goods in the context of his equilibrium unemployment theory). 
According to Wicksell, 
    
there would necessarily be a permanent excess either in the number of workers or in 
the amount of available land (assuming that the population was not correspondingly 
diminished in the one case as a result of emigration, or increased in the other case as a 
result of immigration or natural growth). Theoretically, such an excess would depress 
either the level of wages or of rents, as the case might be, to an unlimited extent. 
([1898] 1936, p. 131) 
25 
                                                 
24 As Cassel put it in his “Grundriss” (1899, p. 441): “If something would be left of a raw 
material [i.e. production factor], the rest would necessarily be offered at a lower price, 
whereby the price of this raw material would be pushed down. Such leftovers can only exist 
of a raw material whose price is zero; free goods of this kind need not be taken into 
account”. And again in 1902b (p. 691): “The production must be conducted in such an 
economic way that every factor of production is fully made use of. An exception from this 
principle can only be made if a factor of production is so abundant that it would not be 
scarce even if its price were zero. That kind of factor is no longer an economic good; it is 
completely excluded from the considerations of the theory of price formation”.  
25 Wicksell’s approach is close to Neisser’s hypothesis that “the employment of workers can 
only be increased if the amount of physical capital is increased at the same time.”([1932] 
1990, p. 141; see also Hagemann, 1990). The long-term adjustment mechanism through 
population change is, of course, part of the classical approach, as mentioned by Neisser (p. 
150). Wicksell did not extend his criticism of Cassel’s general equilibrium system to 
Walras’s, which was also based on fixed coefficients. This may be explained by the fact 
that Cassel did not make Walras’s assumption that the supply of production factors in the 
market is a positive function of their prices, which means that, in contrast with Walras,                                                                                                                                                     
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However, while free land (as in the American old west) and free capital are a benefit 
for society, the same cannot be said of free labour and zero wages resulting from the pressure 
of a growing population that diminishes marginal productivity at a given supply of land and 
capital. Overpopulation, together with falling marginal productivity of labour provoked by 
labour saving technical progress, is the main factor in Wicksell’s interpretation of the high 
rates of unemployment that persisted in Sweden and elsewhere in the mid-1920s, when the 
economy had already recovered from the post-World War deflationary crisis. As Wicksell 
explained in his critique of Ricardo in volume 1 of the Lectures (pp. 133-144), it is the fall in 
real wages that prevents the negative effects of “machinery” on employment, since, under the 
stimulus of lower wages, both new and old methods of production will be adopted in 
equilibrium. Wicksell (p. 141) realized that, if equilibrium real wages were pushed below 
subsistence level, regulations of a minimum real wage at that level would lead to permanent 
unemployment. He came back to this issue in a paper on “Ricardo on Machinery and the 
Present Unemployment” submitted in 1923 to the Economic Journal, but rejected by the then 
editor J. M. Keynes, and finally published with an introduction by Lars Jonung in 1981. Since 
average labour productivity was such that the whole population could be easily supported, 
while labour marginal  productivity was low, the solution was to let real wages go down to 
their equilibrium level and pay complementary wage subsidies financed by taxes on land rent 
and capital interest. “The very worst thing, however, would be to enforce a minimum wage, 
thereby perpetuating the state of unemployment. The true solution... would rather lie in an 
application... of the old Gilbert’s Law, letting wages go down to their natural limit and 
supplementing the deficiency from public resources” (Wicksell [1923] 1981, pp. 204-05).
26     
Even though Keynes rejected Wicksell’s paper, his own explanation of the persistent 
unemployment in the mid-1920s, too, was based on the pressure of increasing population on 
real wages – without, however, taking into account the additional pressure of labour-saving 
technical progress. In Keynes’s opinion, “the most alarming aspect of the prolongation and 
the intensity of the existing unemployment is the possibility that transitory influences may not 
wholly explain it” ([1987] 1923, p. 121). This would bring to the fore “deep causes” closely 
connected with population, in the sense of an attempt by workers to maintain real wages at a 
higher level than allowed by the pressure of population growth on the supply of consumption 
goods, especially in the form of food imports.
27  
  In an undated and hitherto unpublished manuscript on unemployment, probably 
written between 1923 and 1926, Wicksell expressed himself more forcefully on the relation 
between technical progress and unemployment. The manuscript conveys a quite different 
interpretation of the effects of labour saving technical progress on employment, if compared 
to Wicksell’s analysis in the Lectures and in the 1923 paper on machinery, and it gives the 
impression that Wicksell recanted his previous interpretation. According to the manuscript, 
                                                                                                                                                   
Cassel “had to put the (potentially) existing quantity of services equal to the quantity to be 
employed in production in equilibrium” (Schumpeter, 1954, p. 1012, n. 37; see Wicksell 
[1901] 1934, pp. 98-99). 
26 The idea that equilibrium real wages could fall below the level of subsistence also 
appeared in Wicksell’s (1919) criticism of Heckscher’s (1918) theory of the impact of 
prices of goods on factor prices in international trade, which Heckscher later developed, in 
reaction to Wicksell’s comments, into the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem of factor price 
equalization (see Lars Herlitz, forthcoming). 
27 On the debate between Keynes, Beveridge and other English economists on population and 
unemployment in the 1920s see Hancock (1960).                                                                                                                                                     
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technical progress could lead to a situation where a small fraction of the labour force is 
sufficient to operate and maintain the machines. The rest of the workers would become 
permanently redundant with zero wages. If workers were all of the same skill, the rule of free 
goods should apply, for “all labour would become worthless as one worker cannot receive 
more than the other” with the same qualification. In contrast with his previous discussion, 
where the new technology never replaces completely the old one, Wicksell assumed in the 
manuscript that only the new, labour-saving technology is adopted.  
As has been pointed out by commentators,
28 Wicksell’s critical analysis of Ricardo 
requires that the average productivity of labour in one technique never exceeds the average 
productivity of the other technique at all land/labour ratios, which rules out the possibility 
that the new technique completely replaces the old one under flexible wages. In Wicksell’s 
critique of Ricardo, such complete substitution, with ensuing unemployment, would only 
happen if real wages were rigid at subsistence level, which is not mentioned in the pages of 
the manuscript that survived. We may therefore speculate, that Wicksell wrote the manuscript 
out of admission that he had previously discussed a special case only. 
 
6.2 Cassel  
According to Cassel ([1918] 1932a, pp. 320-21), the increase in real wages in Sweden and 
elsewhere in the 1920s was the main factor behind the persistency of high unemployment. 
Instead of following the “open shop” policy advocated by the Webbs and praised by Cassel 
since 1902, trade unions had after World War I increasingly resorted to “monopolistic policy” 
in sheltered trades by means of “closed trade union policy”.
29 This was discussed in detail by 
Cassel (1927) in a study prepared for the League of Nations, mentioned in the 1932 edition of 
his Theory of Social Economy ([1918] 1932a, p. 538). The increasing monopolistic power of 
trade unions was in great part explained by the “state maintenance of the unemployed”, 
especially in the form of public unemployment insurance introduced in Great Britain, 
Germany and some other countries. 
  In 1937, Cassel reviewed Keynes’s General Theory for the International Labour 
Review. In contrast with most book reviews of Keynes in the 1930s, Cassel interpreted the 
book as making a proposition about the long-run equilibrium of the economic system. There 
are therefore no references to Cassel’s own analysis of unemployment equilibrium in his 
textbook, since that discussion had been explicitly associated with short-run equilibrium. 
According to Cassel, the main results of economic theory should be based on the long-period 
method of analysis, with no room for “temporary disturbances”. Economic equilibrium 
means uniform growth with constant relative prices and constant price level over time, which 
implies that the money supply is necessarily an endogenous variable determined by the 
central bank in order to stabilize the price level (Cassel, 1937, p. 440). Cassel (1937, p. 443) 
argued that, under the assumption of a “normal supply of money” (implying an equilibrium 
rate of interest), the Keynesian concepts of liquidity preference and money hoarding are not 
enough to bring about long-run unemployment of labour. “There can be no such thing as a 
general theory of employment or unemployment... There is always a solution of such [general 
equilibrium] system admitting full employment of every factor of production.” 
 
                                                 
28 See Neisser (1932 [1990], pp. 158-60) who, however, wrongly imputes to Wicksell the 
view that minimum wage legislation would not cause unemployment. 
29 See Keynes (1936, p. 16) where the real wage rigidity engendered by “closed shop” policy 




7   Conclusion 
Even though the phrase “forced unemployment”, used by Wicksell in his Malmö and 
Copenhagen public lectures of 1901 and 1907, cannot be found in his published writings, the 
concept is an important feature of his interpretation of the dynamics of the labour market in 
general and of the business cycle in particular. In his 1908 discussion of the depression in 
Sweden, for instance, Wicksell ([1908] 1997, pp. 254-55) pointed to the analytical 
differences between “partial” and “general” overproduction. The 1901 notion of normal 
unemployment as an equilibrium rate is still important, but frictions are less relevant for the 
explanation of aggregate excess supply.  
So-called general overproduction, on the other hand, – i.e. a situation in which labour 
and capital are in over-supply in certain trades without any compensating shortfall in 
other areas – must be fundamentally a quite different phenomenon with radically 
different causes, and it must therefore require substantially different treatment both in 
theory and in practice (p. 255; italics in the original). 
In the same vein, Cassel’s concept of “involuntary unemployment”, if not the phrase, can be 
found in his writings on the business cycle, as witnessed by his first, long article on the topic. 
Cassel (1904, pp. 21-29) described “bad times” as periods of general overproduction leading 
to “shortage of employment for the various production factors”. According to him, “a fall in 
the demand for the products of a certain industry will bring about a secondary sequence of 
overproduction and unemployment in the other production sectors” (p. 29; italics in the 
original). The primary cause of unemployment and overproduction is the uneven 
development of consumption on one side and productive capacity on the other, which Cassel 
(p. 28) ascribed to the “planless” organization of production. More specifically, “bad times” 
are caused by the scarcity of the production factor “waiting” at the end of the boom. 
Producers of capital goods are not able to foresee correctly the forthcoming supply of 
savings. The sudden reduction in the production of fixed capital goods produces the 
depression through its “secondary effects” on the demand for consumption goods. The 
depression is further intensified by the accelerator effect of the reduction in consumer 
demand on the employment of durable means of production (p. 75). It is clear enough that 
fluctuations of labour employment throughout Cassel’s business cycle are essentially 
involuntary, subject to the ambiguity of the voluntary/involuntary distinction in 
“unemployment equilibrium”.  
  The idea of involuntary unemployment in Wicksell and Cassel results in part from the 
notion that, for a given level of aggregate demand, a fall in money wages will be 
accompanied by a corresponding fall in prices, without any effect on real wages. This is one 
of the central aspects of Wicksell’s theory of the “cumulative process”, which Keynes 
repeated in chapter 19 of the General Theory (see Leijonhufvud, 1968, pp. 321-22). It is 
through its indirect impact on the rate of interest or on the rate of return on capital, that a 
reduction in money wages is able to reduce unemployment. It  is  clear  from  the  above, 
however, that Wicksell’s and Cassel’s notions of involuntary unemployment differed from 
the Keynesian notion of involuntary unemployment in macroeconomic equilibrium that later 
came to gain prominence. The old Swedes certainly acknowledged the existence of 
involuntary unemployment caused by a lack of effective demand, but for them it was a 
disequilibrium phenomenon connected with business cycles, whereas their categories of 
equilibrium (involuntary) unemployment were of the frictional sort or based on qualificatory 
mismatch. Nevertheless, the discussions about “normal unemployment”, as opposed to “the 
industrial reserve army”, and about the “rule of free goods” and its role in the explanation of                                                                                                                                                     
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cyclical and persistent unemployment show that involuntary unemployment was a hot issue 
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